Curtis J. Beller v. Nanetter Rolfe, Director, Utah State Driver License Division : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Curtis J. Beller v. Nanetter Rolfe, Director, Utah
State Driver License Division : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Annina M. Mitchell; Solicitor General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Ronald J. Yengich; Yengich, Rich & Xaiz; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Beller v. Rolfe, No. 20060641 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6683
ORIGINAL UTAH 




CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060641 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Phis is the opening brief of appellant on appeal from a final order 
entered by the Honorable Tyrone \l. Medley of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Slate of Utah, following judicial review of the Driver's 
License Division's revocation of Belief's driver's license. 
MARKSHURTLi 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ANNINAM. MITCH EI S 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Fiftl '' '• -«r 
P.O. 140858 
Salt Lake C 
RONALD J W KGIOL. -X< 
YENGIC11. !*•!<'!!& XA!/ 
Attorneys for Appellan 
^ ^ a s t 400 South, Suite 




UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 18 2008 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060641 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is the opening brief of appellant on appeal from a final order 
entered by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, following judicial review of the Driver's 
License Division's revocation of Beller's driver's license. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 844-0858 
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel: (801)355-0320 
Fax: (801)364-6026 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 1 
GOVERNING RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENTS 5 
I. JUDGE MEDLEY'S FINDINGS THAT OFFICER KENDRICK'S 
TESTIMONY FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO JUSTIFY THE TRAFFIC STOP ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS . . . . 5 
II. JUDGE MEDLEY ERRED IN DENYING BELLER RELIEF 
FROM THE DIVISION'S REVOCATION OF HIS LICENSE 10 
A. THE DIVISION WAIVED ITS CLAIM THAT BELLER WAS 
ENTITLED TO NO REMEDY FOR THE VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 10 
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF ARTICLE I § 14 APPLIES 11 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
ORDINANCES 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) 10 
Ballard v. State. 595P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1978) 11 
Brownsberger v. Department of Transp. Motor Vehicle Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 
1990) 16 
Holman v. Cox. 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979) 11 
Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r. 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D.1987) 13,14 
Lavton City v. Noon. 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987) 14 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. 380 U.S. 693. 700-02 (1965) 18,19 
People v. Krueger. 567 N.E.2d 717 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1991) 16 
Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Div.. 755 P.2d 701 (Ore. 1988) 16 
Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360,362 (Utah App. 1992) 6 
Riches v. Director of Revenue. 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo. 1999) 16,17 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P .2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996) 1,6,7 
Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Div.. 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992) 12-14,19 
State v. Bills. 2005 UT App 99, 2005 WL 487722 16 
State v.DeBoov. 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000) 9,12 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,471-73 (Utah 1990) 11,12 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) 6,9 
State v. Lussier. 757 A.2d 1017 (Ver. 2000) 14-19 
ii 
State v. Matinson, 875 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1994) 5,6,9 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d415,416-20 (Utah 1991) 12 
State v. DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) 12 
US Xpress. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 886 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 1994) 10 
Watford v. Ohio Bur, of Motor Vehicles. 674 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1996) . 16 
Whisenhunt v. Department of Public Safety. 746 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Alaska 1987) 18 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14 passim 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.090 7 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100 6 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1616 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 2, 13-17 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 13, 15, 17 
Hi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060641 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and/or (b) provide this Court's jurisdiction over 
this appeal from the district court's judicial review of the adjudicative proceedings 
conducted by the Driver License Division. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that Officer Kendrick violated the Fourth 
Amendment in stopping Beller absent reasonable suspicion? 
Standard of review: The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to substantial 
deference and will be reversed only for clear error, whereas application of the law to the 
facts is subject to the de novo standard of review. E.g., Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 
1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996). 
The issue was raised and ruled on in the trial court (R. 34-38, 64-66). 
2. Did the district court err in ruling that the Federal and Utah Constitution's 
exclusionary rules have no application to a driver license revocation proceeding? 
Standard of review: This issue is one of law, to be reviewed for correctness. 
See, e ^ , State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
The issue was waived by the Division before the hearing officer (R. 53-55). Beller 
properly responded and preserved his claims when the Division tardily raised the issue in 
the trial court (R. 43, 53-59, 62-69). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
The governing constitutional provisions, statutes and ordinances are in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Beller petitioned the Third District Court for judicial review of the Driver License 
Division's revocation of his driver's license, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 (R. 
1-2). Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 79 at 3-16), Beller submitted a memorandum 
arguing that the officer's violation of his Fourth Amendment rights required reinstatement 
of his driver's license (R. 32-40). The Division argued in opposition that there was no 
violation of Beller's Fourth Amendment rights, and that the exclusionary rule did not 
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apply (R. 41-48). In reply, Beller argued that the Division had waived any claim that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply, and that the exclusionary rule did apply (R. 53-60). 
Judge Medley ruled that the officer who stopped Beller did violate the Fourth 
Amendment, but that the exclusionary rules provided by the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions have no application to the Driver License suspension hearing (R. 62-69). 
Beller filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 71). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 1, 2005 at about 1:00 a.m., Officer Kendrick of the Salt Lake City Police 
Motorcycle Squad was involved in a traffic stop at 831 South 300 West with two other 
motorcycle officers, Martinez and Baldwin (R. 79: 3-4). Two motorcycles drove by and 
Kendrick felt that the one with an illuminated engine, Beller's motorcycle, was extremely 
loud (R. 79: 4). 
Although he had no equipment with him to measure sound and could not see the 
make of the motorcycle, Kendrick felt that Beller's muffler violated Salt Lake City 
ordinance 12-2100,1 which forbids people to alter their mufflers in any way that changes 
the pitch or tone (R. 79: 5, 7). He also felt that the illuminated engine violated Salt Lake 
City ordinance 12-28-090, which forbids people to add any lights to their vehicles (R. 79: 
lEither the transcript is in error or the officer was; the correct ordinance is 12-28-
100. 
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7). The two motorcycles drove by again later, and the quieter one of the two drove close 
enough to Officer Martinez that Officer Kendrick decided to stop both motorcycles (R. 
79: 5). Kendrick not know the make of Beller's louder motorcycle with the illuminated 
engine and conceded that he did not know if Kendrick's motorcycle was as it had been 
originally manufactured, or if it had been altered (R. 79: 9, 12-13). 
Judge Medley found that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop 
of Beller's motorcycle, because the officer's testimony failed to establish a violation of 
any law (R. 64-66). However, Judge Medley refused to grant relief from the Division's 
revocation of Beller's license because he ruled that the exclusionary rule has no 
application to the driver license revocation proceedings, which are civil (R. 66-69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Medley correctly ruled that the officer violated Beller's Fourth Amendment 
rights when he stopped Beller's motorcycle without reasonable suspicion of any offense. 
The Division did not raise its claim before the administrative hearing officer that 
the exclusionary rule has no application to driver license revocation hearings. Because 
the Division waived this claim, Judge Medley should not have addressed it. 
Judge Medley erred in holding that the exclusionary rules have no application to 
the Division's revocation proceedings. Review of Utah law and persuasive authorities 
from other jurisdictions confirms the propriety of excluding the fruits of the violations of 
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Beller's Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 rights in such proceedings. 
This Court should reverse the lower court's ruling and the Division's revocation of 
Beller's license. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. JUDGE MEDLEY'S FINDINGS THAT OFFICER KENDRICK'S 
TESTIMONY FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE TRAFFIC STOP ARE NOT 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was created to protect 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The 
United States Supreme Court held that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute^] a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief" State 
v. MatinsoQ, 875 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1994). In order for a traffic stop to be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the police officer's action must be justified at 
its inception and the resulting detention must be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. E.g., id- Specific situations 
in which police officers are justified in making stops of vehicles include the following: 
When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation; 
When the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol 
or driving without a license; and 
When the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
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engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs. 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992). 
Regarding the first justification, the traffic violation must be committed in the 
officer's presence. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Consequently, if 
the officer did not observe the underlying offense, then "the stop [is] not justified at its 
inception and the evidence derived from it must be suppressed." Id. at 1134. Regarding 
the second and third justifications, unlike the first, an officer is justified in stopping a 
vehicle when he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a 
more serious traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving 
without a license, or, that the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as 
transporting drugs. Matinson, 875 P.2d at 586-87 (emphasis added). 
Judge Medley was well within his discretion and committed no clear error2 in 
finding that Kendrick's testimony failed to establish a reasonable suspicion of a violation 
of the city's muffler ordinance, because Kendrick had no means of measuring the level of 
noise Belter's muffler was emitting, and because he had articulated no means of assessing 
whether the muffler was emitting a level of noise that proved that the muffler had been 
altered, in order to establish a violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100 (R. 65).3 
2The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to substantial deference and will be 
reversed only for clear error, whereas application of the law to the facts is subject to the 
de novo standard of review. Rg,, Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
3That ordinance provides, 
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Further, Judge Medley committed no error, see Smoot, supra, in finding that 
Kendrick's testimony regarding the illumination of Beller's motorcyle's engine failed to 
establish a lawful basis for the traffic stop. The city ordinance upon which Kendrick 
relied, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.090, does not address whether people may alter 
the lights of their vehicles.4 While subsection (a)(4) of that ordinance incorporates state 
Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good 
working order and in constant operation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no 
person shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle in a manner 
which will amplify or increase or change the character of the noise emitted 
by the motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally 
installed on the vehicle. No person shall sell, furnish, provide or purchase, 
nor shall any person attach to any vehicle any device which will or is 
intended to increase or change the character of the sound of the original 
muffling equipment on any motor vehicle. No person shall operate a motor 
vehicle with an exhaust system so modified. 
412.28.090 provides: 
A. No person shall drive, move, stop or park, nor shall the owner or person in possession 
cause or knowingly permit to be driven, moved, stopped or parked on any street or alley, 
any vehicle: 
1. Which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property; 
2. Which is not equipped with those serviceable lamps, reflectors, brakes, 
horn and other warning and signaling devices, windows, windshields, 
windshield wipers, mirrors, mufflers, fenders, tires, and other parts and 
equipment in the position, condition and adjustment meeting the 
requirements of the laws of the state as to such parts and equipment; 
3. Which, when upon a street or highway, is operating more than four (4) 
headlamps, auxiliary lamps and/or spot lamps on the front of such vehicle, 
each projecting a beam of an intensity greater than three hundred (300) 
candlepower at any one time; 
4. Which is of such size, weight or condition, or is loaded or equipped in 
such manner as is in violation of the laws of the state with respect to such 
vehicle. 
B. No person shall do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required by the laws of 
the state relating to tires, lamps, brakes, fenders, horns, sirens, whistles, bells and other 
parts and equipment, and size, weight and load of any vehicle; provided, however, an 
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equipment laws, see icL Judge Medley correctly found that Officer Kendrick's testimony 
failed to establish a violation of the statute pertaining to lighting equipment, because 
Kendrick's testimony did not indicate that the illumination of the engine could be seen 
from the front of Better's motorcycle, as would have been essential to establish a 
violation of the relevant equipment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1616(2)(b) (R. 64-
authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with and may display flashing lights 
which do not indicate a right or left turn. 
C. Any motorcycle or motor driven vehicle carrying a passenger on a public highway, 
other than in a sidecar or enclosed cab shall be equipped with footrests for such 
passenger. 
D. No person shall operate any motorcycle or motor driven cycle with handlebars above 
shoulder height. 
E. No person under eighteen (18) years of age shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or 
motor driven cycle upon a public highway unless such person is wearing protective 
headgear which complies with standards established by the state commissioner of public 
safety. This subsection shall not apply to persons riding within a closed cab. (Ord. 62-02 
§ 16, 2002: prior code title 46, art. 9 § 174). 
5Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1616 provides: 
(l)(a) Except as provided under Subsection (l)(b), under the conditions specified under 
Subsection 41-6a-1603(l)(a), a lighted lamp or illuminating device on a vehicle, which 
projects a beam of light of an intensity greater than 300 candlepower shall be directed so 
that no part of the high intensity portion of the beam will strike the level of the roadway 
on which the vehicle stands at a distance of more than 75 feet from the vehicle. 
(b) The provisions of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to head lamps, spot lamps, 
auxiliary lamps, flashing turn signals, hazard warning lamps, and school bus warning 
lamps. 
(c) A motor vehicle on a highway may not have more than a total of four lamps lighted 
on the front of the vehicle including head lamps, auxiliary lamps, spot lamps, or any 
other lamp if the lamp projects a beam of an intensity greater than 300 candlepower. 
(2)(a) Except for an authorized emergency vehicle and a school bus, a person may not 
operate or move any vehicle or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device capable of 
displaying a red light that is visible from directly in front of the center of the vehicle. 
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Because Kendrick had no reasonable suspicion that Beller had violated the law 
when he stopped his motorcycle, the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, and all fruits 
of that stop are subject to suppression. See Matinson and Lopez, supra. 
The stop of Beller9 s motorcycle likewise violated Article I § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides protection which is at least co-extensive with the federal 
counterpart, in forbidding "sweeping, dragnet-type detentions of ordinary people engaged 
in peaceful, ordinary activities. Under both constitutions, the general rule is that "specific 
and articulable facts — taken together with rational inferences from those facts, [must] 
reasonably warrant" the particular intrusion." State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 
2000). See also id. 996 P.2d at 552 (recognizing that Article I § 14 and numerous 
provisions of the Utah Declaration of Rights, consistent with the history of the founders 
of this State, are concerned with "all purpose criminal investigation without 
individualized suspicion."). 
(b) Except for a law enforcement vehicle, a person may not operate or move any vehicle 
or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device capable of displaying a blue light that 
is visible from directly in front of the center of the vehicle. 
(3) A person may not use flashing lights on a vehicle except for: 
(a) taillights of bicycles under Section 41-6a-l 114; 
(b) authorized emergency vehicles under rules made by the department under Section 
41-6a-1601; 
(c) turn signals under Section 41-6a-1604; 
(d) hazard warning lights under Sections 41-6a-1608 and 41-6a-1611; 
(e) school bus flashing lights under Section 41-6a-1302; and 
(f) vehicles engaged in highway construction or maintenance under Section 41-6a-1617. 
(4) A person may not use a rotating light on any vehicle other than an authorized 
emergency vehicle. 
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II. JUDGE MEDLEY ERRED IN DENYING BELLER RELIEF 
FROM THE DIVISION'S REVOCATION OF HIS LICENSE. 
A. THE DIVISION WAIVED ITS CLAIM THAT BELLER WAS ENTITLED TO NO 
REMEDY FOR THE VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
As argued in the trial court, the only issue addressed during the administrative 
hearing was the constitutionality of the stop - an issue that frequently results in the 
Division's taking no action in cases wherein the constitutions are violated (R. 53-55). 
The Division never argued before the administrative hearing officer that Beller was 
entitled to no remedy for Officer Kendrick's violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, 
or that the exclusionary rule did not apply (R. 53-55). 
Because the Division failed to bring this issue to the hearing officer's attention, it 
was improper for the trial court to permit the Division to raise the claim in seeking 
judicial review. See, e.g., Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) 
(in administrative context, a party must "bring an issue to the fact finder's attention to that 
there is at least the possibility that it could be considered."). This preservation 
requirement applies both to factual issues, id., and to legal issues, e.g., US Xpress. Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Com'n. 886 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 1994). 
Because the Division waived its claim that Beller is entitled to no remedy for the 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights before-the hearing officer, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's ruling denying Beller relief and order the revocation of Beller's 
license reversed as well. See id. 
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B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF ARTICLE I § 14 APPLIES. 
Despite finding that Officer Kendrick violated the Fourth Amendment, Judge 
Medley denied Beller relief from the Division's revocation of his license, reasoning that 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases, but only applies in 
criminal and quasi-criminal cases (R. 66-67). The court reasoned that because Utah cases 
characterize driver's license hearings as civil, the exclusionary rules have no application 
to the proceedings (R. 67-69). 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct that driver revocation 
proceedings have been characterized as civil by our courts, see, e.g., Holman v. Cox, 598 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979); Ballard v. State, 595P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1978), the trial 
court was incorrect in ruling that a civil characterization of a suit forecloses application of 
the exclusionary rule under Article I § 14. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that exclusion of evidence is a necessary 
consequence of the violation of Article I § 14. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,471-
73 (Utah 1990) {plurality) (recognizing privacy interest in interior of car and adopting 
exclusionary rule as a necessary consequence of Article I § 14 and noting that there are no 
recognized exceptions to this exclusionary rule); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,416-
20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the Court recognized privacy interest in bank recorder ds un 
Article I § 14, held in accordance with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence 
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of a violation of Article I § 14, and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah 
exclusionary rule); State v. DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of 
illegal checkpoint stop to be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14). This Court has 
applied the mandatory exclusionary rule of Article I § 14 for Fourth Amendment 
violations as well. See State v. Ziegelman. 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah 1995) (finding that 
violation of Fourth Amendment during traffic stop required suppression under Larocco). 
In Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Div., 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 
\992){plurality\ the main opinion reviewed other state court interpretations of their state 
exclusionary rules, and then concluded that under Article I § 14, exclusion would apply in 
cases wherein civil proceedings are criminal in effect and wherein it is necessary to deter 
further illegal searches. Id. at 11-13. The opinion indicated that a law would be viewed 
as criminal in effect or quasi-criminal, or as encompassing the application of the 
exclusionary rule, when "the aims and objectives of a civil penalty are closely aligned 
with those of the criminal law" and when enforcement of the law is "inextricably 
intertwined with proof of criminal activity." Id. at 13-14. In discussing the latter 
circumstance, the Sims opinion expressly relied on a state case holding that a state 
exclusionary rule would apply to a driver license revocation hearing, like the instant one. 
The Sims opinion states, 
The quasi-criminal nature of the tax proceeding in this case is further 
evidenced by the fact that enforcement of the Act is inextricably connected 
with proof of criminal activity. See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'n 405 
N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D.1987) ("[T]he civil and criminal consequences [of a 
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refusal to take an intoxilyzer test] are so intermingled that they are not 
perceptibly different to a lay person."). Violation of the Act necessarily 
involves criminal conduct and a violation of criminal law. Compliance with 
the Act presupposes the possessor's knowledge of the possession of illegal 
drugs and therefore requires a violation of criminal law. "It would be 
anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal 
proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the [civil] 
proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been 
violated, the same evidence would be admissible." Given that an essential 
element of a criminal offense must be established by either violation of or 
compliance with the Act, we are convinced that enforcement proceedings 
under the Act must be viewed as quasi-criminal and the exclusionary rule 
should therefore apply. 
Sims at 14 (citation omitted). Justice Stewart concurred in the result in Sims, albeit under 
federal constitutional law recognizing that the exclusionary rule applies in quasi-criminal 
proceedings. Sims, 841 P.2d at 15. 
As the courts recognized in Kuntz and Sims, "'the civil and criminal consequences 
of a refusal to take an intoxilyzer test are so intermingled that they are not perceptibly 
different to a lay person.'5' Sims at 14, quoting Kuntz, 405 N.W.2d at 289. In driver 
license revocation hearings, the government is required to establish whether the arresting 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol to an unlawful extent, whether the person refused to submit to a test, and 
what the test results were, if any. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-521(3), 53-3-223 
(6)(c). Similarly, in the course of DUI prosecutions, evidence is routinely presented 
regarding whether an officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver 
or conduct a breath test, whether the person refused or submitted to a test, and what the 
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test results were. See, e ^ , Lavton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987) 
(addressing whether officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI and affirming admission 
of evidence of refusal to submit to chemical test). Just as revocation of one's license is a 
consequence of an administrative revocation hearing, courts routinely order revocation of 
driver licenses as part of a sentence in criminal DUI prosecutions. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-220 (division must revoke license upon receiving proof of DUI conviction). 
Because of the inextricable intertwining of civil and criminal elements of proof 
and consequences, the exclusionary rules of Article I § 14 and the Fourth Amendment 
should apply in driver license revocation proceedings. See, Sims and Kuntz, supra. 
Additionally, because both the civil and criminal proceedings hinge on the same 
investigative conduct by the police, the need to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I § 14 is equally compelling in both contexts, and confirms that the 
exclusionary rule should apply here. See Sims, supra, 841 P.2d at 11-13. 
Reference to decisions from other states confirms the propriety of applying the 
exclusionary rule in Utah driver license hearings. In State v. Lussier, 757 A.2d 1017 
(Ver. 2000), in addressing the license revocation statute in Vermont, the Vermont 
Supreme Court held that reasonable ground to suspect a DUI violation is "logically 
extended to the question of whether there was a reasonable basis for the stop/' Id. at 
1020. The court reasoned that a "constitutional stop is a necessary predicate for a finding 
that an officer had 'reasonable grounds' to believe a person was driving while 
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intoxicatedf,]" and noted that the legislature's provision of a hearing to protect the 
statutory right to reasonable cause to justify a breath test logically required inquiry into 
and protection of the constitutional right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. 
Id. at 1023. Despite the fact that the administrative licensing hearings were civil and 
designed, like Utah's, to protect the public by swiftly removing DUI offenders from the 
roadways, Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222, the Lussier court held under the Vermont 
Constitution that the legislature nonetheless did not intend for revocations to be premised 
on unconstitutional traffic stops. Id. at 1020-22. 
Similarly here, where the Utah Legislature contemplates administrative hearings 
inquiring into whether officers requiring chemical tests had reasonable grounds to suspect 
the driving was under the influence, Utah Code Ann. §§ § 41-6a-521(3), 53-3-223 (6)(c), 
the Legislature likewise permits inquiry into the constitutional underpinnings of the stop 
which preceded the tests. Cf Lussier, supra. The Legislature's requirement of 
administrative inquiry into whether an officer had "reasonable grounds" to believe 
someone was driving under the influence prior to seeking a chemical test is fairly read as 
permitting inquiry into Fourth Amendment issues, for the Utah Legislature routinely uses 
the phrase "reasonable cause" in statutes interpreted by the courts as requiring proof of 
probable cause. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-7-2 (requiring reasonable cause for 
warrantless arrests), 77-7-14 (requiring reasonable cause for arrests by private citizens) 
and State v. Bills, 2005 UT App 99, 2005 WL 487722 at *1 (using "reasonable cause" 
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and "probable cause" interchangeably). Cf. Lussier, supra. 
Numerous other state courts have extended the exclusionary rule to driver license 
proceedings. See Watford v. Ohio Bur, of Motor Vehicles, 674 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio App. 
8th Dist. 1996) (holding a constitutional stop is required in analyzing a license 
suspension); People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 717 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1991) (statute 
implicitly requires the arrests triggering license suspension to be lawful); Pooler v. Motor 
Vehicles Div., 755 P.2d 701 (Ore. 1988) (permitting defendants to argue validity of stop 
in driver license proceedings); Brownsberger v. Department of Transp. Motor Vehicle 
Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1990) (license revocation proceeding may be re-opened to 
address unlawful stop). 
Courts outside of Utah have held that the exclusionary rule has no application to 
driver license revocation proceedings. See, e.g.. Riches v. Director of Revenue, 987 
S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo. 1999). These courts justify their holdings with three main reasons: 
driver license revocation proceedings would be unduly complicated if the exclusionary 
rule applied; drunken drivers should be removed from public roadways; and since the 
exclusionary rule applies to parallel criminal D.U.I, prosecutions, there would be minimal 
deterrent benefit from applying the exclusionary rule in the civil proceedings as well. 
See, e.g., Lussier, 757 A.2d at 1025 (discussing Riches as an example of such cases). 
As the Lussier court recognized, there is no empirical evidence or sound argument 
to make in support of the notion that application of the exclusionary rule would unduly 
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complicate or extend the revocation proceedings. Lussier, 757 A.2d at 1025. By statute, 
hearing officers in this state routinely inquire into the "reasonable grounds" or probable 
cause to believe that those requested to submit to chemical tests were driving under the 
influence. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ § 41-6a-521(3), 53-3-223 (6)(c). Particularly where 
the driver license revocation hearing officers have historically and routinely permitted 
inquiry into the bases for traffic stops, as occurred in this case, and have refrained from 
revoking licenses in cases involving Fourth Amendment violations (R. 53-55), it is clear 
that application of the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings is workable and 
expedient in Utah. 
Additionally, according to the Lussier, there is no empirical evidence that applying 
the exclusionary rule would detract significantly from efforts to remove drunken drivers 
from the roads. Lussier, 757 A.2d at 1026. Further, courts must jealously guard drivers' 
constitutional rights to privacy and to be let alone, and cannot permit officers to interfere 
with drivers without cause, or to obtain driver licenses while disregarding the 
constitutions. See id. 
Applying the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings is every bit as important 
as it is in the context of criminal prosecutions, in light of the facts that both proceedings 
involve the same evidence presented through the same officers, and that revocation of 
licenses is "often the most long-lasting and significant sanction imposed on the 
defendants." Lussier, 757 A.2d 1026, citing, Whisenhunt v. Department of Public Safety, 
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746 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Alaska 1987). As the Lussier court candidly recognized, 
The nationwide campaign against drunk driving has taught us, if nothing 
else, that the threat of criminal prosecution has little impact on keeping 
problem drinkers off of our highways. As a result, the focus of state 
legislatures and law enforcement agencies has been on removing 
intoxicated motorists from highways by suspending their licenses or 
otherwise preventing them from driving. Because the primary objective of 
DUI laws and law enforcement is to remove intoxicated drivers from our 
highways, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would be weakened 
significantly if it were not applied in civil suspension proceedings. 
Lussier, 757 A.2d at 1026, citing Whisenhunt 746 P.2d at 1299. 
If Utah departed from the standard practice of applying the exclusionary rule in 
revocation proceedings (R. 53-55), police might be encouraged to make constitutionally 
baseless stops premised on "hunches, or stereotypical beliefs, or for any or no reason 
whatsoever, knowing that even if any evidence obtained from the stop were to be 
suppressed in criminal proceedings, license suspensions could still follow." Lussier, 757 
A.2d at 1026. These considerations weigh in favor of continuing to apply the 
exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings in cases wherein the police violate the Fourth 
Amendment and/or Article I § 14. See Lussier at 1026, citing 1 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 1.7(e), at 202-03 (3d ed.1996) (discussing factors relevant to applicability of 
exclusionary rule), and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02 
(1965) (relying on similar factors in applying exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings. 
Because of the intertwined nature of the civil and criminal proceedings pertaining 
to driver license revocations related to DUIs and chemical tests, because of the equally 
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compelling value of deterring unconstitutional police behavior in traffic stops in both 
contexts, and because the Legislature requires at least some inquiry into Fourth 
Amendment justifications and does not limit this inquiry, this Court should hold that the 
exclusionary rule continues to apply to driver license revocation proceedings. See, e.g., 
Sims and Lussier, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to driver license revocation proceedings, and order the administrative revocation of 
Belter's license reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 2006. 
YENef6JL RICH & XAIZ 
(Attorneys fofc Appellant 
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TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS J. SELLER : 
Petitioner, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. : CASE NO. 050913807 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division 5 
Respondent. 2 
Before the Court is petitioner's Petition seeking review of the 
suspension of his drivers license and driver privileges. Petitioner 
appeared and was represented by Ronald J. Yengich. Respondent appeared 
through Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The Court having 
heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and 
arguments, being fully advised in the premises, enters this Memorandum 
Decision. 
BACKGROUND 
In the early morning hours of July 1, 2005, petitioner and a 
companion passed by Officer Kendrick ("Kendrick") on separate motorcycles 
traveling on the opposite side from where Kendrick was stationed. 
Kendrick later stated that he thought that the motorcycles sounded 
unusually loud. When petitioner passed for the second time, this time 
on the near side of the street, Kendrick pulled petitioner over. 
Kendrick also noticed that the engine of the motorcycle was lighted. 
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Kendrick later testified that he believed that petitioner had 
violated two separate ordinances. First, he believed that petitioner was 
operating a vehicle in violation of either a Salt Lake City or State 
ordinance governing the type of lighting a vehicle may have; and second, 
because he believed that petitioner was operating his motorcycle in 
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.28.100, which prohibits 
modification of an exhaust system of a motor vehicle in such a manner as 
will amplify, increase, or change the character of the noise emitted by 
a motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally 
installed on the vehicle. 
Upon approaching and questioning petitioner, Officer Kendrick 
observed that petitioner appeared intoxicated. The field sobriety tests 
and intoxilyzer results confirmed this observation. Petitioner was 
arrested for operating his motorcycle under the influence of alcohol. 
An administrative hearing to determine whether petitioner's license 
should be suspended followed on July 28, 2005. As a matter of routine, 
the hearing officer apparently inquired into whether the stop was legal, 
but ultimately decided to suspend petitioner's license based upon the 
evidence obtained at the scene and thereafter. 
Petitioner appealed the decision in the present action, asserting 
that the suspension was arbitrary, capricious and without due process of 
law. 
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It should be noted initially, both counsel stipulated to the facts 
and corresponding conclusions of law as described in respondent's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, beginning after the 
initial stop of petitioner. The parties' stipulation is incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
ANALYSIS 
Legality of the Stop 
Petitioner maintains that Officer Kendrick violated petitioner's 
Fourth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution because the 
traffic stop was not justified at its inception, and Officer Kendrick 
lacked reasonable suspicion that petitioner was violating the law. State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In the instant case, the Court finds from a totality, of the 
circumstances that Officer Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion that 
petitioner was violating the law. Officer Kendrick testified he stopped 
petitioners' motorcycle because the sound of the muffler was extremely 
loud and that the engine was illuminated by blue lights. Officer 
Kendrick's detention of petitioner would not have been justified by the 
lights which illuminated the engine, based upon his failure to articulate 
whether the lights could be seen from in front of the motorcycle or 
whether the lights were located on the side of the motorcycle, which 
would not constitute a violation of the law. Officer Kendrick's 
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testimony regarding the engine illumination is unclear and cannot alone 
support a reasonable suspicion that petitioner committed a traffic or 
equipment violation. 
Officer Kendrick further testified that petitioner's motorcycle 
muffler was extremely loud and was suspected to be modified. Officer 
Kendrick based his suspicion upon his experience with motorcycles, yet 
other than riding a Harley Davidson Road King, the record is noticeably 
lacking any specificity describing Officer Kendrick's experience, such 
as how many years he owned and operated motorcycles? How is Officer 
Kendrick familiar with the sound of original and modified motorcycles? 
Officer Kendrick testified that at the inception of the stop, he could 
not identify the make or model of petitioner's motorcycle, nor its 
factory specifications. Other than Officer Kendrick's experience, which 
was not detailed, he had no other objective means of determining the 
decibels of petitioner's motorcycle. Officer Kendrick could not with any 
degree of reliability form a reasonable suspicion that petitioner's 
muffler had been unlawfully modified. Finally, Officer Kendrick 
testified he believed petitioner's motorcycle was custom made, that he 
did not know the bike's specifications, nor what kind of muffler was 
originally installed, therefore, Officer Kendrick could not form a 
reasonable suspicion the petitioner violated Salt Lake City Code § 
12:28.100. 
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Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule 
The crux of petitioner's contention is that the initial stop was not 
based upon reasonable articulable suspicion, and was therefore illegal. 
Accordingly, the argument follows, the evidence was obtained following 
the stop pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of 
the 4th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution. By 
operation of the exclusionary rule, the suspension of driving privileges 
which flowed from that stop must be reversed. The issue which this 
argument presents to the Court is whether the exclusionary rule applies 
to DLD hearings—which are civil in nature, but often result-as was the 
case here—in the deprivation of rights or privileges. In a sense, as 
further analyzed below, the question really is whether the DLD hearings 
are civil, or quasi-criminal in nature. As applied to driver license 
revocation or suspension hearings, this is a matter of first impression 
in this state, and the parties concede that nationally, authorities are 
split.1 
Despite the novelty of this precise issue, both of Utah's appellate 
courts have consistently held that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
in civil cases. See In re: A.R. and C.P., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73 
1While there is a split on this particular issue, at least one 
writer believes that there is a majority view: "a majority of states 
do not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license 
hearings." See Michelle L. Hornish, Note, Excluding the Exclusionary 
Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000). 
BELLER V. ROLFE PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil child protection 
proceedings); State of Utah v. Jarman, 1999 UT App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284 
(probation revocation proceedings). 
However, it is equally clear that, at least under the protection of 
the Utah State Constitution, the exclusionary rule applies to quasi-
criminal proceedings. See, Simms v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 841 P. 2d 6 
(Utah 1992) (reasoning that illegally obtained evidence should be 
excluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal 
or if the exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional 
searches).2 
While petitioner contends that the revocation or suspension of his 
driver's licence was a criminal sanction, he fails to support this 
contention with relevant Utah case law. Instead, he turns to cases from 
other jurisdictions which hold that a legal search and seizure is a 
necessary predicate to introduction of challenged evidence in a driver's 
licence suspension proceeding. This ignores Utah's clear stance that 
nwhile we agree . . . that the right to drive is a 
valuable right or privilege and it cannot be taken 
away without procedural due process, we do not 
agree that revocation proceedings are therefore 
necessarily criminal or quasi-criminal in nature." 
2Simms was a 2-1-2 plurality opinion, however, the one justice 
concurring in the result agreed with the plurality's opinion that the 
tax penalty at issue in that case was in effect criminal. 
/ x-1 
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Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). See also, Holman v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 ("This Court has made clear that license revocation 
proceedings, as such, are civil in nature and that constitutional rights 
afforded defendants in a criminal proceeding do not extend to those 
proceedings"). 
These cases are equally clear that the administrative consequences 
which flow from driving under the influence of alcohol are remedial, and 
not punitive in nature: 
The purpose of this administrative procedure is not 
to punish the inebriated drivers; such persons are 
subject to separate criminal prosecution for the 
purpose of punishment. The administrative 
revocation proceedings are to protect the public, 
not to punish individual drivers. 
Ballard, at 1305. Indeed, as the legislature states in its purpose for 
enacting the restriction: 
The Legislature finds that the purpose of this 
title relating to suspension or revocation of a 
personfs license or privilege to drive a motor 
vehicle for driving with a blood alcohol content 
above a certain level or while under the influence 
of alcohol . . . is protecting persons on highways 
by quickly removing from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (2006). 
Based upon the clear weight of authority, because the Courts of this 
state uniformly consider a drivers' license revocation proceeding to be 
a civil action and not a quasi-criminal action, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply. Therefore, based upon the parties' stipulation 
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referenced hereinbefore and respondent's consideration of the evidence 
obtained at the scene in reaching her decision to suspend petitioner's 
license was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, petitioner's 
claim is hereby dismissed and the previously ordered stay of suspension 
of petitioner's license is hereby lifted. This constitutes the final 
Order of the Court on the matters referenced herein. No further Order 
is required. 
Dated this / day of June, 2006 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this / day of June, 
2006: 
Ronald J. Yengich 
Attorney for Petitioner 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rebecca Waldron 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.090 
12.28.090 Lights, Brakes, And Other Equipment: 
A. No person shall drive, move, stop or park, nor shall the owner or person in possession 
cause or knowingly permit to be driven, moved, stopped or parked on any street or alley, 
any vehicle: 
1. Which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property; 
2. Which is not equipped with those serviceable lamps, reflectors, brakes, horn and other 
warning and signaling devices, windows, windshields, windshield wipers, mirrors, 
mufflers, fenders, tires, and other parts and equipment in the position, condition and 
adjustment meeting the requirements of the laws of the state as to such parts and 
equipment; 
3. Which, when upon a street or highway, is operating more than four (4) headlamps, 
auxiliary lamps and/or spot lamps on the front of such vehicle, each projecting a beam of 
an intensity greater than three hundred (300) candlepower at any one time; 
4. Which is of such size, weight or condition, or is loaded or equipped in such manner as 
is in violation of the laws of the state with respect to such vehicle. 
B. No person shall do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required by the laws of 
the state relating to tires, lamps, brakes, fenders, horns, sirens, whistles, bells and other 
parts and equipment, and size, weight and load of any vehicle; provided, however, an 
authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped with and may display flashing lights 
which do not indicate a right or left turn. 
C. Any motorcycle or motor driven vehicle carrying a passenger on a public highway, 
other than in a sidecar or enclosed cab shall be equipped with footrests for such 
passenger. 
D. No person shall operate any motorcycle or motor driven cycle with handlebars above 
shoulder height. 
E. No person under eighteen (18) years of age shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or 
motor driven cycle upon a public highway unless such person is wearing protective 
headgear which complies with standards established by the state commissioner of public 
safety. This subsection shall not apply to persons riding within a closed cab. (Ord. 62-02 
§ 16, 2002: prior code title 46, art. 9 § 174) 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100 
Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in good working order 
and in constant operation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no person shall modify the 
exhaust system of a motor vehicle in a manner which will amplify or increase or change 
the character of the noise emitted by the motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the 
muffler originally installed on the vehicle. No person shall sell, furnish, provide or 
purchase, nor shall any person attach to any vehicle any device which will or is intended 
to increase or change the character of the sound of the original muffling equipment on 
any motor vehicle. No person shall operate a motor vehicle with an exhaust system so 
modified. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 
(l)(a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke the person's license under Section 4l-6a-520 is entitled to a hearing. 
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the 
day on which notice is provided. 
(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver 
License Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days 
after the date of arrest. 
(d) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License 
Division under this Subsection (1), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (l)(d)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from 
the date of arrest under Section 4 l-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223, 
53-3-23 L or 53-3-232: or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 4 l-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state 
that would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), if a hearing is requested by the person, the 
hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the 
offense occurred. 
(b) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver 
License Division and the person both agree. 
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 4 l-6a-502, 41-6a-517, 41-6a-530, 
53-3-231. or 53-3-232; and 
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section 4l-6a-520. 
(4)(a) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(i) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(ii) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation 
Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78- 46-28. 
(5)(a) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was 
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the 
Driver License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle 
in Utah beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (5)(a)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 4 l-6a-517.41-6a-520.41-6a-530. 53-3-223, 53-3-23L or 
53-3-232: or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date 
of arrest under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that 
would constitute a violation of Section 41 -6a-502. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid 
before the persons driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(c) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following 
a proceeding allowed under Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(6)(a) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this 
section may seek judicial review. 
(b) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
(c) Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1616 
(l)(a) Except as provided under Subsection (l)(b), under the conditions specified under 
Subsection 41-6a-1603(l)(a), a lighted lamp or illuminating device on a vehicle, which 
projects a beam of light of an intensity greater than 300 candlepower shall be directed so 
that no part of the high intensity portion of the beam will strike the level of the roadway on 
which the vehicle stands at a distance of more than 75 feet from the vehicle. 
(b) The provisions of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to head lamps, spot lamps, auxiliary 
lamps, flashing turn signals, hazard warning lamps, and school bus warning lamps. 
(c) A motor vehicle on a highway may not have more than a total of four lamps lighted on 
the front of the vehicle including head lamps, auxiliary lamps, spot lamps, or any other 
lamp if the lamp projects a beam of an intensity greater than 300 candlepower. 
(2)(a) Except for an authorized emergency vehicle and a school bus, a person may not 
operate or move any vehicle or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device capable of 
displaying a red light that is visible from directly in front of the center of the vehicle. 
(b) Except for a law enforcement vehicle, a person may not operate or move any vehicle 
or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device capable of displaying a blue light that is 
visible from directly in front of the center of the vehicle. 
(3) A person may not use flashing lights on a vehicle except for: 
(a) taillights of bicycles under Section 41-6a-l 114; 
(b) authorized emergency vehicles under rules made by the department under Section 
41-6a-1601; 
(c) turn signals under Section 41 -6a-1604; 
(d) hazard warning lights under Sections 41 -6a-1608 and 41-6a-1611; 
(e) school bus flashing lights under Section 41-6a-1302; and 
(f) vehicles engaged in highway construction or maintenance under Section 41-6a-1617. 
(4) A person may not use a rotating light on any vehicle other than an authorized emergency 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 
(l)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or, when this chapter or Title 41, Chapter 6a, 
Traffic Code, specifically provides for denial, suspension, or disqualification, the division 
shall deny, suspend, or disqualify the license of a person upon receiving a record of the 
person's conviction for any of the following offenses: 
(i) manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from driving a motor vehicle, or 
automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(ii) driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of them to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle as prohibited in Section 4 l-6a-502 or as 
prohibited in an ordinance that complies with the requirements of Subsection 41-6a-
510(1); 
(iii) driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content prohibited in Section 4 l-6a-502 or as prohibited in an ordinance 
that complies with the requirements of Subsection 41-6a-510(l); 
(iv) perjury or the making of a false affidavit to the division under this chapter, Title 41, 
Motor Vehicles, or any other law of this state requiring the registration of motor vehicles 
or regulating driving on highways; 
(v) any felony under the motor vehicle laws of this state; 
(vi) any other felony in which a motor vehicle is used to facilitate the offense; 
(vii) failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state if a motor 
vehicle accident results in the death or personal injury of another; 
(viii) two cheirges of reckless driving committed within a period of 12 months; but if upon 
a first conviction of reckless driving the judge or justice recommends suspension of the 
convicted person's license, the division may after a hearing suspend the license for a 
period of three months; 
(ix) failure to bring a motor vehicle to a stop at the command of a peace officer as 
required in Section 4 l-6a-210; 
(x) any offense specified in Part 4, Uniform Commercial Driver License Act, that requires 
disqualification; 
(xi) discharging or allowing the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in violation of 
Subsection 76-10-508(2); 
(xii) using, allowing the use of, or causing to be used any explosive, chemical, or 
incendiary device from a vehicle in violation of Subsection 76-10- 306(4)(b); 
(xiii) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the persons 
body in violation of Section 4 l-6a-517; 
(xiv) until July 30, 2015, operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having any alcohol in the person's body in violation of Section 53-3-232; 
(xv) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having any 
measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body in violation of Section 
41-6a-530;and 
(xvi) engaging in a motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway in 
violation of Section 41-6a-606. 
(b) The division shall immediately revoke the license of a person upon receiving a record 
of an adjudication under Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, for any of the 
following offenses: 
(i) discharging or allowing the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in violation of 
Subsection 76-10-508(2); and 
(ii) using, allowing the use of, or causing to be used any explosive, chemical, or 
incendiary device from a vehicle in violation of Subsection 76-10-306(4)(b). 
(c) Except when action is taken under Section 53-3-219 for the same offense, the division 
shall immediately suspend for six months the license of a person upon receiving a record 
of conviction for any of the following offenses: 
(i) any violation of: 
(A) Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
(B) Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act; 
(C) Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(D) Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act; or 
(E) Title 58, Chapter 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; or 
(ii) any criminal offense that prohibits: 
(A) possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, sale, or transfer of any substance 
that is prohibited under the acts described in Subsection (l)(c)(i); or 
(B) the attempt or conspiracy to possess, distribute, manufacture, cultivate, sell, or 
transfer any substance that is prohibited under the acts described in Subsection (l)(c)(i). 
(2) The division shall extend the period of the first denial, suspension, revocation, or 
disqualification for an additional like period, to a maximum of one year for each 
subsequent occurrence, upon receiving: 
(a) a record of the conviction of any person on a charge of driving a motor vehicle while 
the person's license is denied, suspended, revoked, or disqualified; 
(b) a record of a conviction of the person for any violation of the motor vehicle law in 
which the person was involved as a driver; 
(c) a report of an arrest of the person for any violation of the motor vehicle law in which 
the person was involved as a driver; or 
(d) a report of an accident in which the person was involved as a driver. 
(3) When the division receives a report under Subsection (2)(c) or (d) that a person is 
driving while the person's license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked, the 
person is entitled to a hearing regarding the extension of the time of denial, suspension, 
disqualification, or revocation originally imposed under Section 53-3-22 L 
(4)(a) The division may extend to a person the limited privilege of driving a motor vehicle 
to and from the person's place of employment or within other specified limits on 
recommendation of the trial judge in any case where a person is convicted of any of the 
offenses referred to in Subsections (1) and (2) except: 
(i) automobile homicide under Subsection (l)(a)(i); 
(ii) those offenses referred to in Subsections (l)(a)(ii), (a)(iii), (a)(xi), (a)(xii), (a)(xiii), 
(l)(b),and(l)(c);and 
(iii) those offenses referred to in Subsection (2) when the original denial, suspension, 
revocation, or disqualification was imposed because of a violation of Section 41 -6a-502, 
41-6a-517, a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of Subsection 41-6a-
510(1), Section 4 l-6a-520, or Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person 
was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain after having been originally 
charged with violating one or more of these sections or ordinances. 
(b) This discretionary privilege is limited to when undue hardship would result from a 
failure to grant the privilege and may be granted only once to any individual during any 
single period of denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification, or extension of that 
denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification. 
(c) A limited CDL may not be granted to an individual disqualified under Part 4, Uniform 
Commercial Driver License Act, or whose license has been revoked, suspended, 
cancelled, or denied under this chapter. 
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(l)(a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating 
or has violated Section 4 l-6a-502, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain 
blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, 
alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 4 l-6a-517, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, request 
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with 
the standards under Section 4 l-6a-520. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 4l-6a-502 includes any similar local ordinance 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6a-510(l). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical 
test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41 -6a-502 or 41-6a-517 shall, and 
the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath 
alcohol content in violation of Section 41 -6a-502 or 41- 6a-517, or if a peace officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in 
violation of Section 41-6a-502. a peace officer shall, on behalf of the division and within 
24 hours of arrest, give notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's license to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(4)(a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; 
and 
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division. 
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the 
division, also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar 
days after the day on which notice is provided: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test 
results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated 
Section 4l-6a-502 or 41-6a-517. 
(6)(a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the 
person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be 
heard shall be made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under 
Subsection (5). 
(b)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the 
division in the county in which the arrest occurred. 
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person 
both agree. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d)(i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of relevant books and papers; or 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if 
made by the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor 
vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as 
required in the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a 
motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(7)(a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this Subsection (7), is 
for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous 
ten years under this Subsection (7) is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest. 
(8)(a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to 
cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is 
reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division 
hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section may file 
a petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is 
governed by Section 53-3-224. 
